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Introduction
Nuclear energy, whilst being a critical source of energy, also has the potential to be a devastating 
hazard (Koronowski & Romm 2013). Over the last 40 years, there have been several general 
emergency events, causing significant disturbances to people’s health and livelihoods (World 
Nuclear Association 2012). During such events, it has been necessary to evacuate people living 
within the vicinity of such stations in order to avoid contamination by radiological fallout. 
However, residents and disaster-management institutions have shown during many of these past 
evacuations that they are not well aware of and prepared for such hazards (Funabashi & Kitazawa 
2013; Ziegler & Johnson 1984). These hazards caused massive confusion and uncertainty amongst 
evacuees, which created greater disorder, obstructed mitigation efforts and consequently put 
thousands at risk of exposure to a radiological hazard.
The Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (KNPS) is situated approximately 30 km from central Cape 
Town. Approximately 140 000 people reside within the immediate 16 km radius of the KNPS, 
known as the Formal Emergency Planning Zone (FEPZ). Institutions such as Eskom and the 
City of Cape Town Disaster Risk Management Centre (CoCT DRMC) invested much effort and 
resources into preparing for a potential general emergency. This includes developing evacuation 
models, integrated disaster-management plans amongst local-government institutions and 
emergency services as well as safety-and-preparedness guidelines for the public to inform and 
prepare themselves in order to reduce the risk of them being exposed to radiological hazards. 
However, despite the availability of this information through various mediums, it is unknown 
whether residents of the FEPZ utilise the information to better inform and prepare themselves 
for a general emergency event.
This article aims to present the findings of an exploratory research project amongst residents 
residing in the proximity of KNPS, investigating the levels of knowledge and preparedness 
concerning a general hazard. Specifically the main objectives of the article were to:
• ascertain the level of the residents’ knowledge of and familiarity with general emergency-
related information, plans and procedures
Ward 23 in the City of Cape Town South Africa is situated within 16 km of Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Station (KNPS). Massive investments were made to provide the 13 800 residents of 
Ward 23 with information on emergency preparedness and evacuation procedures in case of a 
general-emergency event at KNPS. However, it is not known whether these efforts to inform 
and prepare the proximal residents for a general emergency have been effective or not. The 
objective of this study was to investigate the level of knowledge of and preparedness for an 
emergency exhibited by residents of Ward 23. Data was collected through the distribution 
of semi-structured questionnaires to 204 residents at the study site to ascertain their views 
on the provision and accessibility of emergency information and to find out whether they 
utilised this information to prepare themselves. The results revealed that the majority of 
interviewed residents had very poor knowledge concerning emergency procedures, and few 
had made any effort to prepare themselves. The majority of better-informed and prepared 
residents tended to reside closer to KNPS. The poor levels of knowledge and preparedness 
are attributed to residents’ lack of awareness concerning the availability of information, 
misconceptions regarding a nuclear hazard and a general emergency event or a lack of 
incentive to inform themselves due to a perceived high sense of security and the improbability 
of such an event occurring. To improve resident knowledge and preparedness, efforts should 
be made to advertise the availability and importance of such emergency information and 
enhance incentives for residents to inform themselves.
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• identify their attitude and perception of access to and the 
availability of general emergency-related information as 
well as whether it is beneficial to them
• examine what practices, strategies and plans residents 
would follow in a general emergency event
• determine whether a geographic distance-decay style 
of relationship exists between respondents’ levels of 
informedness and preparation and their geographical 
proximity to KNPS.
The findings of this investigation will be discussed 
and compared to local and international literature to 
interpret the results. Finally, several recommendations 
for stakeholders will be put forward to address the issues 
raised in this article.
The literature on general 
emergencies and disaster 
preparedness
Nuclear energy has been regarded as popular source of 
energy generation for the last 60 years with 434 nuclear 
power stations operating globally at present (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 2013). Despite the danger associated 
with the radiological elements utilised to generate electricity 
at nuclear power stations, the high-quality engineering, 
workforce, management and safety guidelines involved in 
the operation of these facilities have allowed the nuclear-
energy industry to flourish and to be regarded as a safe and 
reliable form of energy generation (Funabashi & Kitazawa 
2013; Koronowski & Romm 2013). However, several general 
emergencies (in which large quantities of radiation have 
been released or leaked from the nuclear plant into the 
surrounding environment) have occurred at nuclear power 
stations such as Three Mile Island, United States of America 
(USA), in 1979 (World Nuclear Association 2012); Chernobyl, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in 1986 (World Nuclear 
Association 2013a) and recently Fukushima Dai-ichi (FNPS), 
Japan, in 2012 (World Nuclear Association 2013b). During 
these events, communities within the vicinity of these plants 
were under threat of exposure to and contamination by the 
radiological release.
Before the Three Mile Island or Chernobyl disasters, the 
improbability of a general emergency event was so high that it 
was considered unnecessary by most nuclear power stations 
or their regulatory bodies to develop any emergency or 
evacuation plans (Carter & Thompson 1987). Consequently, 
when these events occurred, evacuation and relief efforts 
were severely hampered due to the poor emergency 
management. These obstacles were exacerbated further by 
the massive confusion and panic amongst proximal residents 
who were poorly prepared to react to such hazards.
Subsequently, nuclear-related stakeholders globally put 
a much greater effort into formulating strategies and 
procedures to respond to a general emergency event 
(Council for Excellence in Government 2006). These include 
providing civilians residing in the vicinity of nuclear stations 
with details on emergency procedures and evacuation in 
order to reduce their risk and vulnerability (San Luis Obispo 
County 2013). This information is usually made available 
through mail, flyers, safety guidelines, public information 
centres, regular public-safety forums or online information 
(Nuclear Information and Resource Centre 2011; Oak Ridge 
Associated Universities 2010). Such strategies coincide 
with the recent shift in the disaster-management paradigm 
which increasingly emphasises strategies of disaster-
risk reduction (DRR) to focus more on preventative or 
mitigating approaches in order to reduce the vulnerabilities 
of particular groups (Van Niekerk & Vermaak 2004; Van 
Riet 2009). According to Pelling’s (2003) theory of urban 
vulnerability, awareness of and preparedness for particular 
hazards are crucial aspects in reducing people’s level of 
vulnerability to any hazard.
Unfortunately, despite the previous paradigm shifts in 
thinking about general emergencies and disaster reduction, 
Japan was caught unprepared during the 2011 FNPS 
meltdown (Funabashi & Kitazawa 2013). For the past several 
decades, nuclear energy in Japan (like in many other countries) 
has been considered to be one of the safest power-generating 
means available with a very good safety track record (Tanaka 
2012). However, not wanting to generate concern amongst 
the population or create a lack of confidence in the nuclear 
industry in Japan, officials did not promote disaster planning 
or drill practices as they believed it would cause unnecessary 
anxiety amongst people living near nuclear facilities 
(Funabashi & Kitazawa 2013). A false sense of security was 
largely to blame for the chaotic and disorganised manner in 
which people were evacuated during the 2011 FNPS general 
emergency. Consequently, when the disaster struck, local 
government and evacuation coordinators were ill prepared 
on how to proceed, and local residents were poorly informed 
and confused as to what they should do.
Along with South Africa’s national energy provider and 
nuclear regulator, Eskom, the CoCT DRMC has shown 
commitment to formulating general emergency strategies 
and procedures. These include several integrated plans 
and models to assist in preparing evacuation and disaster-
response strategies in case of a general emergency (Eskom 
2008; Marks et al. 2007). They have also shown commitment 
to communicating general emergency-related information 
to the public through various mediums such as Information 
Calendars (Eskom 2013c), Family Disaster Preparedness 
Guidelines (Disaster Risk Management – Cape Town 2012), 
a quarterly Public Safety Information Forum (Eskom 2012) 
as well as information online and in public libraries (City of 
Cape Town 2012a; Eskom 2013a, 2013b).
However, the recent general emergency in Japan has brought 
about a rise in concern about and criticism against the KNPS 
(Froggatt, Hazemann & Schneider 2012; Koeberg Alert 
Alliance 2012; Phakathi 2012). Immediately after the incident, 
media and civil-society groups raised questions about 
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KNPS’s safety and preparedness for a general emergency, 
especially in light of the realisation that the station was built 
within 8 km of a fault line (Gosling 2011; Raubenheimer 
2013). Concern has also been raised regarding the rapid 
growth of suburbs and development within the FEPZ and 
whether evacuation plans have taken into consideration the 
increasing size of the population (Disaster Risk Management 
– Cape Town 2012; Marks et al. 2007).
Methodology
Site and respondent selection
Ward 23 forms part of the City of Cape Town District 
Municipality, lying approximately 12 km north of central 
Cape Town and directly south of the KNPS. According to 
South African census data from 2011, the ward’s population is 
approximately 34 000 (Department of Strategic Development 
Information and GIS 2013). Other key demographic 
information is as follows:
• The predominant race is white (European) South African 
(76%).
• Of those aged 20 years and older, 82% have completed 
high school and some form of tertiary education (45%).
• Of the labour force (ages 15 to 64), 95% is employed.
• Concerning income, 83% of the population earn above 
ZAR 3200 per month. Furthermore, 21.5% of the ward’s 
population earn between ZAR 12 801 and 25 600, and 
22.8% earn between ZAR 25 601 and 51 200.
The majority of the ward’s area is farmland or undeveloped 
land (City of Cape Town 2012b) with most of the population 
and development concentrated along the coast in five distinct 
suburbs, namely Blouberg, Bloubergstrand, Melkbosstrand, 
Van Riebeeckstrand and Duynefontein (see Figure 1).
Whilst development has been kept to a minimum due to the 
proximity of KNPS, development along the coast has grown 
rapidly. Between 2001 and 2011, the number of households 
and the population grew by 75% and 70%, respectively. 
Ward 23 was selected as the study site because the ward 
is situated almost wholly within KNPS’s 16 km Formal 
Emergency Planning Zone with its five suburbs situated next 
to the station as seen in Figure 1 and Table 1.
A purposive-sampling technique was employed by the 
researcher in the study site. The sampling criteria included 
only adults (18 years and over) who resided (or considered 
themselves residents) in one of the five suburbs of Ward 23. 
Minors (below 18 years), daily commuters or day visitors into 
the ward were excluded from the sampling. The respondents 
were divided into five geographical strata based on the five 
suburbs located in the study site, which would allow for:
• maximising respondent variation within the purposive 
sample (Koerber & McMichael 2008)
• observing any relationship or differences between 
respondents’ proximity to KNPS and their levels of 
knowledge and preparedness.
Questionnaire layout and distribution
A semi-structured, qualitative questionnaire was developed 
and distributed to residents over the course of four weeks. 
The questionnaire consisted of 33 questions, which included 
open-ended, polar and Likert-scale based questions. Polar 
and Likert-scale type questions had an adjoining section 
for respondents to explain their selected answers more 
descriptively. The questionnaires were styled on the KAP 
method (World Health Organization 2008) with questions 
grouped into particular themes, focussing on:
• ‘Knowledge’-oriented questions assessed respondents’ 
awareness of and familiarity with information provided 
in general emergency guidelines and plans. These 
questions assessed how much respondents knew and 
the accuracy of their knowledge of the information 
available.
KNPS
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FIGURE 1: Map of study site, Ward 23.
TABLE 1: Approximate distances between Koeberg Nuclear Power Station and 
the suburbs in Ward 23.
Suburb Approximate suburb distance from KNPS
Kilometres Miles
Duynefontein 2–2.6 1.24–1.62
Van Riebeeckstrand 2.5–4.12 1.55–2.56
Melkbosstrand 4.52–6.86 2.81–5.18
Bloubergstrand 12.66–15.30 7.87–9.51
Blouberg 15.31–16.54 9.51–10.28
FEPZ 16† 9.9
FEPZ, Formal Emergency Planning Zone; KNPS, Koeberg Nuclear Power Station.
†, The FNPS boundary is not a perfect 16 km radius from the KNPS, appearing ‘jagged’ to take 
streets and properties into account.
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• ‘Attitude’-oriented questions focussed on analysing 
respondents’ perceptions and opinions on particular 
issues and matters.
• The ‘Practices’-oriented questions explored the measures 
that respondents would take in preparing themselves 
and their households as well as the course of action they 
would take in a general emergency.
• Sampling took place in each of the suburbs, the researcher 
going from door to door to interview residents one at a 
time.
Methodology for data consolidation
A total of 230 questionnaires were completed via door-to-
door distribution. Questionnaires with errors, incomplete 
answers, inconsistencies, lack of depth or ‘prank answers’ 
were removed from the data consolidation. In total, 203 
questionnaires were acceptable for consolidation (Table 2).
Data have been consolidated and are presented in a qualitative 
and descriptive format in the ‘Analysis of findings’ section. 
Some data were quantified into charts in order better to 
examine and display response proportions and variation 
between different suburbs. A discussion of the consolidated 
data will be presented in the following section. The data was 
compared with relevant literature.
Analysis of findings
Analysis of respondents knowledge
Awareness of information
Almost half of respondents in Ward 23 were unaware of 
general emergency-related information or quarterly forums 
that have been made available to the public (Figure 2). This 
was observed especially in the communities of Blouberg 
and Bloubergstrand where the majority of respondents 
claimed to be unaware of any sources of information (47 of 
52 respondents and 25 of 31 respondents, respectively). A 
greater proportion of the respondents from Melkbosstrand 
and Duynefontein appeared to be aware of the existence of 
information related to general emergencies.
Knowledge of and familiarity with information and 
protocol about general emergencies
Similar trends were observed concerning respondents’ 
knowledge of and familiarity with notification about general 
emergencies (Figure 3), the procedure for evacuating 
and collecting children from school (Figure 4), the roads 
designated as emergency routes (Figure 5) and the location of 
emergency assembly points or mass-care centres (Figure 6). 
Despite the general lack of familiarity with and knowledge of 
this information, a greater proportion of Duynefontein and 
Melkbosstrand respondents exhibited some knowledge.
Explanations given by respondents for the poor familiarity 
amongst the majority of respondents across Ward 23 with 
TABLE 2: Total number of questionnaires consolidated for findings.
Ward 23 suburbs Total number of questionnaires consolidated
Duynefontein 33
Van Riebeeckstrand 37
Melkbosstrand 50
Bloubergstrand 31
Blouberg 52
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FIGURE 2: Respondents’ familiarity with information related to general 
emergencies.
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FIGURE 3: Respondents’ knowledge of methods of general-emergency 
notification.
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FIGURE 4: Respondents’ knowledge of procedure for evacuating school children.
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FIGURE 5: Respondents’ knowledge of evacuation routes out of Formal 
Emergency Planning Zone.
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information related to general emergencies included the 
following:
• Some respondents were not aware of the availability or 
existence of such information.
• Some respondents considered the information too long 
and boring to read.
• Some acknowledge that ‘I have never got around to 
reading it’.
• Some believed that the information was unnecessary or 
would not assist them.
• Respondents did not believe that information was 
accurate or reliable, or they believed that information was 
used to create false sense of security.
• Some respondents did not keep the information at hand 
or lost it.
• Some respondents admit to throwing it away.
During interaction with respondents, it was revealed that 
they hold serious misconceptions about the potential hazard 
to which they were exposed. Many respondents appeared 
to believe that a general-emergency event, or ‘if something 
went wrong’ at KNPS, would cause an ‘atomic-bomb style’ 
explosion in which everything around KNPS would be 
‘incinerated’ and irradiated for several kilometres within 
minutes. Therefore, many respondents believed that there 
was no need to be informed or prepared because they would 
be unable to escape in time and perish anyway.
Analysis of respondents’ attitudes and perceptions
Perceptions of safety
As seen in Figure 7, the majority of respondents across 
the suburbs stated that they felt neutral or safe (76 and 69, 
respectively) living in the vicinity of KNPS. Interestingly, 
most living in suburbs closer to the station held a more 
positive opinion of their safety than those residing further 
away.
Their positive opinions were based on their belief that KNPS 
is well managed and ‘in good hands’ as well as knowing 
someone (friend, neighbour, spouse, family member or 
themselves) who either had worked or was currently 
working at KNPS. Notably, the majority of respondents 
throughout the ward was more concerned about the threat 
of crime, car accidents and other everyday hazards to their 
personal safety. They perceived these hazards to be more 
likely to occur than a general emergency at KNPS.
Perceptions of accessibility, sufficiency and necessity of 
information
The majority of respondents situated further away from 
KNPS, particularly in Blouberg and Bloubergstrand, had a 
negative perception of the availability and accessibility of 
information sources related to a general emergency (Figure 
8). Many felt that institutions (namely Eskom) had made little 
or no effort to inform them in any way. Inversely, the majority 
of respondents residing closer to KNPS felt that information 
had been made available to the public by stakeholders such 
as Eskom and CoCT DRMC.
Despite many respondents stating that information was 
available and accessible, some believed that the information 
provided was insufficient. Several respondents felt that 
the information was poor and lacked detail whilst others 
complained that it was too complicated and confusing. 
Inversely, others felt that it was sufficiently informative 
and easy to understand. It was observed that the majority 
of respondents residing in suburbs closer to KNPS felt that 
information was sufficiently informative and adequate whilst 
those further away had mostly an opposite perception.
Whether sufficient information was provided or not, many 
respondents felt that it was unnecessary to be well informed 
because of the low probability of such an event, because 
emergency personnel would instruct them what to do or 
because there would be no hope of a timeous escape. As a 
result, many respondents admitted to discarding or throwing 
away information given to them because the information 
was deemed to be unnecessary or unimportant.
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FIGURE 6: Respondents’ knowledge of location of emergency assembly points 
and mass-care centres.
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FIGURE 7: Respondents’ self-rating of their perception of safety residing in the 
Formal Emergency Planning Zone.
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FIGURE 8: Respondents’ perception of the accessibility and availability of 
information related to general emergencies.
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Perceptions on preparation for and evacuation in case of 
a general emergency
In total, 105 of the respondents admitted to being unprepared 
whilst only 38 considered themselves to be prepared in some 
way or another (Figure 9).
Their reasons for the lack of (or need for) preparation 
included:
• They have never thought about it (this perception was 
generally observed in Bloubergstrand and Blouberg and 
amongst respondents who were poorly informed).
• KNPS is safe, and the probability of an emergency event 
is very low, which means that the risk is low.
• The authorities will instruct them on what to do, when to 
do it and where to go.
• If an event occurs, the situation will be too chaotic 
and hopeless. This perception was widely held by 
respondents, concerned about heavy traffic as a result 
of limited road networks and a large population within 
the ward as well as the probability of general panic and 
confusion amongst evacuees.
Analysing respondents’ practices
Disaster preparation and planning
Only 26 respondents had prepared some form of household 
disaster plan or had a pack of emergency supplies at the 
ready. Table 3 lists the varied plans and items that these 
respondents said they would implement and/or take.
Other general practices and plans concerning preparedness 
commonly exhibited by these respondents included the 
following:
• They stored important documentation (identity 
documents, bank details, birth certificate, et cetera) in one 
place for easy collecting if need be. Similar provisions 
were made for personal items such as family memorabilia.
• They kept information sources on general emergencies 
such as calendars and guidelines in a known and 
accessible location so as to be consulted in cases of need.
• They ensured that their vehicles have enough petrol to 
travel more than 25 km away from home.
• Several respondents felt that they were adequately 
prepared by just reading and familiarising themselves 
with general-emergency guidelines. Thus, they would 
not be confused or frightened but would know what to 
expect and what to do when necessary.
Evacuation reaction
When asked where they would go in the event of a general 
emergency, many respondents agreed that they would 
probably travel ‘as far away as possible’, listing locations they 
perceive to be far away enough (Figure 10). When queried 
about whether they would wait for instructions before 
evacuating, these respondents exhibited negative opinions or 
distrust towards authorities leading an evacuation. Only 16 
respondents stated that they would first wait for information 
about weather conditions and the expected direction of 
the radiation path and orders from the authorities before 
deciding on their course of action.
Discussion
An analysis of the consolidated data reveal that the majority 
of respondents in Ward 23 have poor levels of knowledge 
and awareness of information related to general emergencies, 
and only a few individuals have made any preparations 
for a potential nuclear hazard and evacuation. Several 
interconnected factors have been identified as responsible 
for the level of information awareness, knowledge and 
preparation. Respondents also exhibited particular 
perceptions of safety or even fatalism.
Proximity to hazard affecting levels of 
knowledge and preparedness
Interestingly, there was no evidence that different 
demographic characteristics influenced respondents’ levels 
of awareness, knowledge and preparedness. Whilst this 
seems strange or unlikely, especially in the setting of a highly 
heterogeneous country as South Africa, it must be taken 
into consideration that Ward 23’s population is somewhat 
homogenous with the majority of respondents interviewed 
being white, highly educated, employed and living in well-
developed formal residential zones. I observed no trends or 
patterns that suggested a link between particular demographic 
characteristics such as age, education, gender, class or wealth 
and respondents’ levels of knowledge and preparedness.
However, it was evident from the data that there were 
significant differences between these levels of knowledge and 
preparedness and respondents’ proximity to KNPS. In the 
literature of geographic vulnerability, it has been commonly 
observed that those who reside closer to a known hazard 
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FIGURE 9: Respondents self-rating their perceived level of preparedness for a 
general emergency.
TABLE 3: List of respondents’ varied disaster plans and supply-pack items.
Disaster plan Supply pack
Emergency details of family Water bottles
Checklist of what to take Canned food
Predetermined place to go to Packed clothes
Close all windows and doors Trailer (with several supplies)
Leave immediately Medical kits (bag for important medication)
Await instructions by authorities Camping gear
Consult guidelines before deciding  
what to do
Go-bag (small amounts of each supply in it)
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tend to demonstrate greater knowledge about the hazard 
and have a greater probability of developing appropriate 
preparations for such an event (Lindell & Hwang 2008). A 
similar trend was observed amongst respondents residing 
in suburbs closer to KNPS, especially in Duynefontein and 
Melkbosstrand, who exhibited greater familiarity with and 
knowledge of emergency-related information. They also had 
more positive perceptions about the availability, accessibility 
and sufficiency of said information, and they felt better 
prepared and safer than respondents residing further away 
(e.g. Blouberg and Bloubergstrand). The decreased levels of 
information awareness, knowledge and preparation amongst 
respondents residing further away from KNPS are probably 
as a result of a distance-decay effect in which people tend 
to be less responsive to hazards and exhibit increasingly 
lower levels of knowledge and preparation with increasing 
distance from a hazard (Eldridge & Jones 1991).
Problems with communication and the 
distribution of information
A multitude of information and material related general 
emergencies is distributed by Eskom and the CoCT DRMC 
to the public via several mediums such as by post, online, 
at local municipal offices, at public libraries or at the KNPS 
public information centre (City of Cape Town 2012a; Eskom 
2013b). Mr Phidza, the Stakeholder management Manager at 
KNPS, explained in a personal interview that several ‘push 
and pull’ information strategies have been implemented by 
Eskom annually. Either updated information is distributed 
(push strategy) to residents via mediums such as calendars 
and leaflets, or residents are invited and encouraged to attend 
(pull strategy) quarterly ‘Public Safety Forum’ meetings, visit 
the Eskom visitors centre, et cetera. However, despite these 
efforts to make this information available and accessible to 
the public, almost half of the respondents were unaware that 
general-emergency information has been made available and 
is accessible to the public. Many respondents, especially in 
Blouberg and Bloubergstrand, claim that there has been little 
to no effort by stakeholders to provide them with information 
regarding KNPS or a general emergency. Therefore, relevant 
stakeholders may need to look into and address this problem 
concerning information communication and distribution to 
the respondents.
Misconceptions regarding a general emergency 
and exposure to hazards
It was observed that at least a quarter of the respondents 
believed that a general-emergency event at KNPS could 
result in an atomic-bomb-style explosion or blast-wave that 
would cause immediate death and destruction. Thus, many 
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FIGURE 10: Locations to which respondents would evacuate in the event of a general emergency.
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respondents fail to see the need to properly inform or 
prepare themselves. However, this perception of their 
exposure to a hazard is greatly mistaken. The materials that 
nuclear power stations like KNPS use to produce energy 
are radiological in nature but not explosive (Nosowitz 
2011). The belief in an exploding nuclear power station is a 
common misconception amongst people globally because 
of the incorrect association of nuclear-energy generation 
with how nuclear weapons operate (Boisvert 2013). This 
incorrect assumption amongst the majority of respondents 
concerning the nature of their nuclear-hazard risk is most 
likely a consequence of their poor levels of awareness of and 
familiarity with general-emergency information provided by 
Eskom and CoCT DRMC.
Predetermined place to go in case of an 
emergency
Previous observations at other general emergency situations 
such as the 1979 Three Mile Island general emergency 
indicated that the majority of people (even those outside 
of the designated evacuation zone) would evacuate 
themselves much further than the authorities stated was 
actually necessary (Zeigler & Johnson 1984). The cause for 
this exaggerated evacuation was as a result of evacuees’ fear 
of radiation and its long-term health effects as well as the 
misconception or misinformation of hazard exposure and 
a distrust of authorities (Brumfield 2013; Donn 2013). The 
majority of respondents in Ward 23 would appear to exhibit 
behaviour similar to other general-emergency evacuees in 
order escape the hazard. The respondents’ desire to move 
so far away, coupled with their poor levels of preparation 
and knowledge as well as misconceptions concerning a 
nuclear emergency, appear to be very similar to the extreme 
evacuation traits observed internationally.
Sense of security affecting informedness and 
preparedness
Whilst some respondents see no need to be informed or 
prepared because they perceive the situation as hopeless, many 
respondents, especially in Duynefontein and Melkbosstrand, 
stated that they felt safe with nuclear power and confident in 
KNPS’s management. Some also indicated that they felt safe 
because they have a relationship with KNPS staff. This sentiment 
is not dissimilar to Japan’s population who, prior to the 2011 
FNPS general emergency, were confident in the management 
and operation of its nuclear-power industry, believing the 
possibility of a nuclear-related disaster to be highly improbable 
(Funabashi & Kitazawa 2013; Tanaka 2012). Therefore, during 
the 2011 FNPS general emergency, their false sense of security 
left them ill prepared and highly vulnerable. The social capital 
developed from relationships between respondents and KNPS 
staff may generate greater confidence in and a perception 
of safety regarding KNPS and its management, but it may 
ultimately make them less prepared and vulnerable in the event 
of a general emergency (Claridge 2004).
Threat of improbable hazards versus everyday 
hazards
A lack of preparedness by respondents could include the fact 
that Ward 23 of the CoCT is not exposed to major natural or 
technological hazards (Van Niekerk & Visser 2010). Hence, 
with little risk to their livelihoods, respondents have little 
incentive or need to prepare emergency plans or supplies for 
such unlikely hazards (Council for Excellence in Government 
2006). This coincides with the concept of the ratchet effect 
according to which respondents may perceive that preparing 
for an improbable hazard is a waste of resources (Pelling 
2003). Respondents generally felt more concerned preparing 
themselves against more common and probable everyday 
hazards such as crime and/or car accidents.
Perception of safety influenced by awareness 
and knowledge
Whilst it could be supposed that those residing closer to a 
known hazard would feel less safe than those living further 
away, the opposite was discovered, namely that those residing 
closer to KNPS felt significantly safer than those further away. 
From the analysis of data gathered, it can be assumed that 
the perceptions of safety are linked to the level of knowledge 
of respondents concerning information related to nuclear and 
general emergencies. Several of the previously listed factors 
such as the high levels of misconception concerning exposure 
to a nuclear hazard and poor communication and distribution 
of information, which showed the highest figures in Blouberg 
and Bloubergstrand, probably contributed to a lack of 
confidence about safety amongst respondents of these suburbs. 
Conversely, respondents of Duynefontein and Melkbosstrand 
felt safer due to increased awareness, communication and 
familiarity (but not necessarily knowledge of the content) of 
distributed information.
However, whilst most respondents stated that they generally 
felt safe residing in the FEPZ on a day-to-day basis, they also 
expressed major insecurity and an almost fatalistic perception 
with regard to a general emergency and their evacuation 
situation. A major concern of respondents is that, in the event 
of a general emergency, the transport routes leading away 
from the area will be unable to accommodate the evacuation 
of the large (and rapidly growing) population residing in the 
FEPZ before being impacted by the hazard (be it by radiation 
contamination or an explosion, in some opinions). Similar 
fears have been expressed in the US and Europe, indicating 
that a large and growing population in the vicinity of nuclear 
stations may inhibit evacuation efforts (Donn 2013). Statistics 
South Africa confirms this, stating that the number of 
residents and households within Ward 23 has grown by 70% 
and 75%, respectively, between 2001 and 2011 (Department 
of Strategic Development Information and GIS 2013). The 
CoCT DRMC has been working on creating accurate and 
up-to-date evacuation simulations and emergency exercises 
for a general-emergency event (Marks et al. 2007). Under 
present conditions, they can evacuate all residents from the 
FEPZ in the designated 16-hour timeframe. However, they 
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acknowledge that the rapid urban growth within the FEPZ 
has made it increasingly difficult to ensure that an evacuation 
can occur within the specified timeframe.
Conclusion
This study has found the majority of respondents across 
Ward 23 to be poorly informed and unprepared for a 
general-emergency event. The consolidation of data revealed 
evidence of a link between respondents’ increased proximity 
to KNPS and the increased levels of awareness, knowledge 
and familiarity concerning general-emergency information, 
perceptions of the availability, accessibility and sufficiency 
of said information as well as perceptions of personal 
preparedness and safety. The two main causes for the general 
lack of informedness amongst respondents were identified. 
The first includes that respondents were unaware that 
information related to general emergencies was available to 
the public or that they have not received such information. 
The second cause relates to respondents’ lack of incentive to 
inform themselves. This disincentive to acquire or familiarise 
themselves with information can be attributed to (1) a 
perception of hopelessness and fatalism, (2) misconceptions 
concerning their exposure to a hazard, (3) the improbability 
of a threat or their views on their safety and complacency and 
(4) social capital with KNPS staff and trust in management.
It can be recommended that stakeholders such as Eskom and 
DRMC improve branding and advertise their information 
better to make residents of the ward more aware that 
information exists. Stakeholders should especially focus on 
correcting misconceptions amongst the public such as the idea 
of KNPS exploding. Other efforts should include attempting 
to make information more attractive to incentivise the public 
to familiarise themselves with the information and to engage 
with the stakeholders which provide them.
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